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Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white
books and through lectures relayed on black-and-white television. In this way she
learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She
knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of
"physical" that includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and
neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts
consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles. If physicalism is
true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise is to suppose that
there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is just what physicalism
denies… it seems, however, that Mary does not know all there is to know. For
when she is let out of the black-and-white room or given a color television, she
will learn what it is like to see something red, say. This is rightly described as
learning—she will not say “ho hum.” Hence, physicalism is false.
This is Frank Jackson’s "Mary the Brilliant Color Scientist," or "Mary’s Room"
thought experiment, in its most polished and consistent form (Jackson, in There's
Something, 51). Jackson offered this refined version in 1986, intending it to replace his
initial formation of the thought experiment, created in 1982. It has proven to be one of, if
not the single most controversial thought experiment in the philosophy of mind. Why
might this be so? There are two specific reasons why this thought experiment has become
such a touchstone in the contemporary discussions of the philosophy of mind. First, as is
made explicit by Daniel Stoljar and Yujin Nagasawa, the thought experiment “zeroes in”
on that aspect of conscious experience that is most puzzling: the quality of experiencing
consciousness first-hand, the “what-it-is-like” to have a conscious experience. We are so
inadequately equipped to explain this experience to one another that by virtual consensus
we have come to consider it to be wholly ineffable (Stoljar and Nagasawa, 1-2). The
second is the relationship that Frank Jackson has with his “creation.” In the span of three
years, from 1993 to 1996, Jackson went from blatantly denying the truth of a solely
physical universe to rejecting wholesale the conclusions he initially arrived at through his
thought experiment. He explained this change in his understanding in 2004, saying
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“[T]he argument... contains no obvious fallacy… yet its conclusion—that Physicalism is
false—must be mistaken" (Stoljar and Nagasawa, 23). I am inclined to agree. This
reversal of his initial position means that Jackson has experienced both of the immediate
reactions I feel most readers have after having been exposed to the Mary thought
experiment for the first time; either they find it obviously true, or they find it obviously
fishy (responses it elicits by design; we will return to this point later.). For those of you
whose reactions are like mine, of the fishy kind, here is the challenge: pointing to where
exactly the argument goes wrong. That is precisely what I intend to do here. I will first
discuss the broader class of “knowledge arguments.” Then, after a brief discussion of
what a thought experiment and an intuition are, I will run over the various forms
Jackson’s thought experiment has taken over the years, as to make clear all the relevant
features that may elude our grasp were we to consider just one. Specifically, I will be
looking at three forms from Jackson 1983, 1986, and 1998. After I’ve propped it up nice
and thorough, I will knock it all down by demonstrating a fatal flaw that will plagued any
Mary thought experiment know matter what form it may take.
So what is a knowledge argument, and why does it matter here? Let me lead with
an example. Consider this example from C. D. Broad: Consider a “mathematical
archangel,” a being with domain specific omnipotence, knowing everything about logic
and chemistry. If this were all the angel knew, it would be unable, according to Broad, to
predict the way that ammonia would smell had it never smelled ammonia. Therefore,
there must be some other sort of stuff to know that is not simply chemical or logical or
any combination of the two alone (Stoljar and Nagasawa, 6). What this example
demonstrates is twofold. First, it shows us an example of what is called the knowledge
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intuition. The knowledge intuition is a “prima facie modal truth;” it is an “obvious”
statement of possibility. Think about the way roses smell. Compare the experience of
smelling a rose with all the sorts of things you can learn about roses and smells from
textbooks: the chemicals involved, the sensory tissues of the nose and their connections
with our brains, etc. No matter how many textbooks you read, it seems obvious that you
at no point know what roses smell like unless you smell them; unless you experience the
smell of a rose. Or similarly, how would you explain to a blind person what a rose smells
like? What could you say that would make them understand? Could you do this? For
many, it will seem obvious that there just is not any way at all to make a blind person
experience color through linguistic descriptions of our experiences of color alone. It’s
just one of those things you have to do for yourself. If you have this feeling, then you feel
the knowledge intuition: that it is possible to know physical knowledge without knowing
any phenomenal knowledge. Another way of putting phenomenal knowledge is “what it
is like.” Second, it demonstrates a common conclusion that is drawn from this intuition; if
it is possible to have no experiential knowledge, no phenomenal knowledge, when we
have nothing but physical knowledge, then it seems there must be more than just what is
physical. Thus we have the full definition of a knowledge argument as understood by
Stoljar and Nagasawa: any argument that includes the knowledge intuition as a premise,
and concludes that Physicalism, the belief that everything that exists is physical, is false.
The simplest form of such an argument may have been given by Jackson, when he says:
“Nothing you could tell me of a physical sort captures the smell of a rose, for instance.
Therefore, Physicalism is false” (Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia, 127). If these are the
two sufficient conditions for being a knowledge argument, containing the knowledge
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intuition and reasoning that Physicalism must be false, then there have been many
historical instances of knowledge arguments much earlier than any of Frank Jackson’s
work, like Broad’s mathematical archangel discussed earlier.
So if he didn’t come up with the idea himself, and his argument is not the only
knowledge argument, what makes Mary special? Why is she different? One obvious
difference is the rhetorical effectiveness of the Mary thought experiment as opposed to
the simplified form of the knowledge argument given above. Even if they assert the same
conclusion, I think it is fair to say that Mary’s Room does so in a more convincing way.
So why is that? It begins with the fact that it is a thought experiment. What a thought
experiment is supposed to is allow us to reason to conclusions about normally observable
events when “normal”, traditional kinds of experiments cannot be completed, or as a
supplement to these normal experiments. They consist of a series of imaginable physical
events, that can be imagined in sequence until they have run their course, until they reach
an end state, and the conclusions we can infer from the imagining of this end state. These
conclusions function as pseudo-observations; what you conclude is not observations
proper, but instead are rational intuitions; they are things that seem right, and are not
immediately demonstrable as false. These feelings may fall short of being empirical
evidence, but they are usually extremely compelling nonetheless; it will many times just
seem to be the only way things could be.
There are a number of things that can be done to strengthen feelings of
intuitiveness. One such thing is to set up the thought experiment in such a way that it is
reductio ad absurdum. This means setting up an argument where the truth of one of the
premises leads to a contradictory conclusion, and so we can reject the premise
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responsible for the contradiction as false. Another tool we can use to strengthen our
intuitiveness of our conclusions is to use eliminative inference, where every alternative
conclusion is shown to be less satisfactory than our conclusion. One thought experiment
that puts both to use masterfully is Galileo’s Falling Bodies Thought experiment. Galileo
presents the thought experiment through a dialogue in his Discoursi:
SALVIATI: If we take two bodies whose natural speeds are different, it is clear
that on uniting the two, the more rapid one will be partly retarded by the
slower, and the slower will be somewhat hastened by the swifter. Do you
not agree with me in this opinion?
SIMPLICIO: You are unquestionably right.
SALVIATI: But if this is true, and if a large stone moves with a speed of, say,
eight, while a smaller stone moves with a speed of four, then when they
are united, the system will move with a speed of less than eight. Yet the
two stones tied together make a stone larger than that which before moved
with a speed of eight: hence the heavier body now moves with less speed
than the lighter, an effect which is contrary to your supposition. Thus you
see how, from the assumption that the heavier body moves faster than the
lighter one, I can infer that the heavier body moves more slowly.
And so, Simplicio, we must conclude therefore that large and small bodies
move with the same speed, provided only that they are of the same
specific gravity (Swan, 346-47).
Thus, it would seem there is simply no need to observe the scenario laid out by Galileo;
either a lighter and heavier stone tied together fall faster than the heavy stone by itself or
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they don’t. If they do, we get a contradiction, so we only have one option left. The
dialogue compels the audience’s imagination into considering the conclusion
undoubtedly, obviously correct; you can see where this could come in handy.
With a basic understanding of what a thought experiment is, the knowledge
intuition and the knowledge argument, we can begin a deeper analysis of Jackson’s
thought experiment and knowledge argument combo. Perhaps it would be even better to
say family of thought experiments, as he has given the same basic argument in a
multitude of forms, each highlighting important features of their Wittgensteinian family
resemblance, with varying degrees of rhetorical effectiveness. By looking at three
versions in particular, I will identify the important aspect of the argument laid bare by
each, and then conjoin them into a form of the Mary thought experiment/ knowledge
argument that is as transparent as possible.
Let’s begin with Jackson’s 1986 article “What Mary Didn’t Know,” where we get
the form of the argument I began this project with. The important thing to note here is the
description of what counts as “physical”: “Everything in completed physics, chemistry,
and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts
consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles” (51). Now what does it
mean to know everything in “completed” physics? Well, it means that there is not a
single fact about physics, that Mary would be surprised about; she has a perfect physical
theory. She knows all physical facts and the causal relations between them, themselves
being physical facts. What do theories do? They are more than just a collection of facts.
Following Van Fraassen (1970, 1989), I am going to here on discuss theories with
respect to models. A model is called a model for a particular theory if and only if the
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theory is entirely true with respect to that model. Models here are some mathematical
structure or another: some geometric figure, some collection of sets and functors between
them, etc. In the case of physics, we might think of a probability distribution as our
model. Under this interpretation of theory, at any given time, (at least for all those
physicists who aren’t Mary,) the job of science is to try and produce a theory that is made
true by a probability distribution representative of the real world. We might think of the
distribution as representing possible events in space-time and the likelihood of them
occurring under such and such conditions, and so on. What physicists do is use empirical
observations to formulate a prediction about the nature of reality, in the form of a
probability distribution potentially equivalent with that one representing the real world.
They then find ways of testing the model, and they adjust according to the results. In
other words, they make a guess as to what the full model of the universe is, using the
pieces of the model we have gained knowledge of through empirical data. For Mary, any
prediction she made would have to be 100% accurate, if it was indeed the case she had a
final, complete theory of physics. If it turned out that her model did not align in every
conceivable way with the actual probability distribution that is reality, then there must be
some fact about physics that she does not know, and this is exactly what we are asked to
assume when doing Jackson’s thought experiment. That is enough on theories for now,
but we will return.
The original form of the thought experiment is found in “Epiphenomenal Qualia”
published in 1983:
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the
world from a black-and-white room via a black-and-white television monitor. She
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specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the
physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe
tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for
example, just which wave-length combinations from the sky stimulate the retina,
and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of
the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of
the sentence ‘The sky is blue.’ (It can hardly be denied that it is in principle
possible to obtain all this physical information from black-and-white television,
otherwise the Open University would of necessity need to use color vision.)
What will happen when Mary is released from her black-and-white room
or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems
just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual
experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was
incomplete. But she had all physical information. Ergo there is more to have than
that, and physicalism is false. (130)
Here the argument is unique in two particular ways that I find significant. Instead of
physical “facts,” Jackson describes Mary as knowing all physical information. The
difference is significant because of the difference in the connotations of the terms. The
term information I associate with formal information theory, and as such may be a
possible aid in discovering a solution to the challenge Mary poses to physicalism. Also,
when Jackson discusses introducing Mary to colored television, he raises an important
question that is central to the issue: whether she will in fact learn anything or not. But
before we have had a real chance to formulate an answer for ourselves, in the next
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sentence Jackson answers the question for us: “[Upon seeing colored images for the first
time] it seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual
experience of it.” Thus we have a second intuition lurking in the premises, tipping the
scale even further against physicalism; that a person seeing colored images for the first
time must learn something new. Notice how effective this intuition is; certainly, I will
concede that I instinctively feel that Mary, having never seen color, upon doing so will
learn something new. I admit the apparent correctness of this learning claim, and I will
venture to speak for the general populace and say that the way I feel is not uncommon.
But if we can find no reason for rejecting our feelings; if it turns out that our intuitions
are to be trusted or that we can find no evidence to the contrary, this feeling (one that a
great number of us most likely experience when we imagine seeing color for the first
time) will lead us to conclude that there is indeed non-physical information to be learned.
Whether we can trust our intuitions or not, the two aspects of this argument are here
made explicit, where everywhere else they are only implied. Jackson treats as
synonymous the terms facts and information, and implies that we have a “learning
intuition” so to speak, that being presented with a new modality of sensory experience--in
this case the introduction of full-color visual experiences, as opposed to merely blackand-white experiences--will result in learning.
Returning to Jackson’s 1986 article, there is a third form of the Mary thought
experiment that can tell us about the argument family in which Jackson positions his
thought experiment. This form allows us to categorize the experiment in ways that are not
so easily ascertained by studying any other version. Here Jackson gives the argument in
the form of a syllogism, reformulated to deal with the objections to his original
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formulation in “Epiphenomenal Qualia” offered by Paul Churchland in his “Reduction,
Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States”:
1. Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know about other
people.
2. Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know about other
people (because she learns something about them on her release.)
3. Therefore, there are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the
physicalist story. (293)
A few differences between the original argument and this revision are immediately clear:
the argument in this version claims as necessary a strict ordering of events. That is, the
two premises above (numbers 1 and 2) must occur before Mary experiences color, for
them to support the conclusion. Each premise is formulated so as to support the
conclusion that physicalism is false. This is stated clearly in the original form as well, but
to see it set apart by parenthesis and as a part of a sparser argumentative form in general
serves to bring to the forefront the temporal component of both the premises and the
conclusion. Furthermore, and perhaps more interestingly for my purpose, Stoljar and
Nagasawa point out that this argument is a quantificational one; it makes claims about a
class of entities:
1. Every physical truth is such that Mary (before her release) knows that truth.
2. It is not the case that every truth is such that Mary (before her release) knows that
truth.
3. Therefore, there is at least one truth that is nonphysical. (14)
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What becomes uniquely clear in this restatement is that, especially in the conclusion,
Jackson's argument hinges on the nature and existence of one specific truth; his
conclusion is that there is at least one truth that is non-physical. Stoljar and Nagasawa can
also be credited with the last pertinent observation: the conclusion of Jackson's original
formulation--that at least one non-physical truth exists, and therefore physicalism is false-can be contested, not because of the logic of his argument, but because of a possible
interpretation of his terms. Thus, the original form of the experiment cannot ever
disprove physicalism. His reformulation of the experiment (and their restatement of it
above) closes that loophole. To understand this point, Stoljar and Nagasawa give a
definition for the psychophysical conditional, a logically deductive conditional
concerning the supervenience of the psychological on the physical. According to Jackson
in “Mind and Illusion” (1998), the intuition that Mary learns something new when seeing
a color television set is an intuition that “Mary cannot carry out an a priori derivation
from the physical information imagined to be at her disposal to the phenomenology of
color vision.” It may be the case that the psychophysical conditional is possibly necessary
and a posteriori, learnable only by some empirical observation or another, but a response
to a version of the knowledge argument set up so as to suppose the “a posteriori-ness” of
the learning intuition is not an argument equivalent to Jackson’s original family of
arguments. So if we wish to formulate responses to the true set of Mary thought
experiments, we must understand the psychophysical conditional as being a priori. So
then, physicalism, the claim that everything that is true of the world is physical in nature,
we assume to imply both that the psychophysical conditional is necessary and also a
priori (Stoljar and Nagasawa 15).
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I have discussed in length the different features of the family of arguments under
scrutiny that are important for a proper understanding of what the whole family is really
up to, but that are more or less concealed from most of the argument forms in particular,
if not by all but one. I now will formulate a version of the argument that makes explicit
every important feature of the Mary thought experiment in all its various
implementations. I call it the "Hail Mary" version of the argument, because it is a sort of
last ditch effort to maintain any version of the argument's validity and soundness, one that
is the clearest, and that accounts for as many of the traditional objections that it can
through clarification alone, without changing the semantic content of the first form of the
Thought Experiment given in 1983. If this version can be defeated, any version can. It is
as follows:
1. Assume that there is a possible world where a scientist (one who makes predictions
based on facts) named Mary knows the complete and final physical theory, that is,
all physical information/all physical facts, despite having never been anywhere but
the black-and-white room she is currently in nor has she ever had any exposure to
colors besides black and white (from Jackson 1983 and 1986).
2. If at time t Mary has never seen color, and at any time t+n, were she to be presented
with a color television, it is possible that she learns something she didn’t know
beforehand (Jackson 1983).
3. If physicalism is true, then the proposition, “it is true in every possible world that the
psychological intervenes on the physical,” is true a priori (Jackson 1998).
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4. Necessarily, if Mary knows the complete and final physical theory at time t and
learns at any time t+n, then there exists at least one non-physical truth (Jackson
1986).
5. Either there is at least one non-physical truth, or physicalism is true (see Jackson in
There is Something About Mary, pg. xvii).
6. Therefore, it is possible that physicalism is false.
In this form, we can see all the features of the family resemblance explicitly
stated, and the many systems of logic that would be needed to symbolize a Mary Thought
Experiment; the temporal aspect, the alethic modality and Jackson’s assumed twodimensional semantics for it, the quantification, the production of an intuition by the
knowledge argument; we can see all these things clearly in the “Hail Mary” form. Thus
concludes my attempt at a fair treatment of Jackson and his reasoning. I believe this to be
a robust exegesis of what Jackson was trying to get at, and I hope that this final version of
my own design is one Jackson would agree is not only fair, but as polemically capable as
any he came up with himself.

Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary
So, now that we have had a thorough introduction to the knowledge argument and
its parts, and the special class of knowledge arguments that are the family of Mary
thought experiments, does any error become apparent? Or is their apparently no error? I
suggest that there is indeed an error, although it is far from being apparent. This is
precisely why the argument has been so controversial, and continues to generate replies
to this day. It is why it is so fascinating, precisely because there is as of yet nothing
approaching a consensus on what exactly the problem is, if there is a problem at all.
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Allow me to put forth my proposal for at least a problem with the thought experiment,
making no claim about whether it is “the” problem. Let’s begin with the synonymy of
fact with information that Jackson makes. As I said before, I believe that formal
information theory is helpful here. In Information Theory, one standard definition of
information is given by Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver in The Mathematical
Theory of Communication. They present information strictly in terms of the probabilities
of events, demonstrating how it can be quantified with absolute precision. For example,
think of a message in a sealed envelope that you’ve just received in the mail. Reading the
return address, you learn that the letter was sent to you from your grandmother back
home. Now knowing your grandmother, you know she is monolingual, specifically
knowing only that language that is your first language (let us just use English). Now two
things are true of the message within this envelope: Knowing your grandmother, we
know that there are only a limited number of messages that she could have wrote us, and
that the message within the envelope could be any one of them, but it can only possibly
one of them. So, before we open the envelope, there is a great deal of uncertainty about
what it contains inside, and if we were to open it and begin reading, with each word we
read, we get closer and closer to knowing exactly what message we have been sent. With
each consecutive word, the number of possible messages gets smaller and smaller, until
finally we have read the note in its entirety and have learned exactly what message we
have been sent. Now with respect to the example just given, we can see that information
functions to reduce uncertainty. Before we have opened the envelope: we know there are
only so many things that the message within could be, or in other words, we have a rough
probability distribution of possible messages, and even before reading anything we can
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put varying levels of probability on each possible message from background information
about our grandma; how her health is doing, what hobbies she has picked up recently,
how close it is to Thanksgiving, and so on. In its unread state, the note from our grandma
has the potential to greatly inform us as to what she is communicating to us, and different
words will inform more or less as we read them (for example, if we were to read
“Thanksgiving” it would greatly increase the chance that the letter is about a
Thanksgiving dinner, and it would greatly reduce the chance of the letter being about her
latest game of bridge, etc.) but as we read more and more of the letter, the chance that the
next word we read will clue us in as to what the letter is about, that is, that whatever we
think it is about up unto that word is mistaken, slowly decreases; it is highly unlikely that
we could read all the way to the last sentence, and have not come extremely close to
knowing what the letter is about; there isn't much chance that grandma wrote an entire
letter where we can be completely mislead as to what she is writing us for until we read
the very last sentence. So to recap, think of information as having the ability to reduce
uncertainty, and as being carried by some sort of “message”, or if you like, a symbol.
Relative to just one set of possibilities, where only one alternative is the “true” state of
the natural world, each consecutive piece of relevant symbols must contain less and less
information, so that if you have amassed say 99% if the relevant messages related to a
probability distribution, that other 1% is highly unlikely to let you in on anything that will
drastically change the likelihood of alternatives. Now knowing this, we can make a
crucial inference: were you to arrive at the exact distribution of probabilities, that is, the
“one true” distribution, there is nothing you could afterwards learn that could provide you
any relevant information at all. No symbol after having arrived at the true distribution of
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probabilities could suggest a different distribution. Information can only exist when there
is space between your understanding and reality. Whenever you know the “true”
probability distribution, then you know all the messages that could possibly inform about
said distribution; all the relevant information.
Next, let’s take a closer look at what exactly a physical theory accomplishes.
Mary is a color scientist, one who knows all the physical facts. It is fairly uncontentious
to say that a crucial part of any science is the testing of theories through experimentation
to see which ones can be tossed out, and which ones are the closest to the truth. How
experiments test theories is usually understood in terms of prediction. Theories make
predictions about what would happen given a particular set of initial conditions and a
certain amount of time. If we know the initial conditions required, and what outcome our
theory predicts, in principle all we need to do is recreate the initial conditions, observe
what happens, and see if it matches up with what our theory said would happen. If it
doesn’t, it’s possible we did not do the experiment well enough; for example, we could
have forgotten to control for, to try and minimize the influence, of a condition that could
alter the expected outcome. But incase we can verify all the proper controls were done,
our theory can be regarded as incomplete, or not totally correct. When the latter is said to
have occurred, our experiment has lessened the chance that whatever theory we took our
initial conditions from is correct. Earlier I mention Van Fraassen, and I think his
definition of theory is helpful here, as is the concept of a model. To Van Fraassen, a
scientific theory is a sort of formal system, containing a set of axioms, and a related
model. Now there are many different sets of axioms, and many different models, but for
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each set of axioms, there is one unique model that it has a special relationship with. He
writes:
A model is called a model of a theory exactly if the theory is entirely true if
considered with respect to this model alone. (Figuratively: the theory would be
true if this model was the whole world.) (1989, 218)
Let me put it another way: consider some set of propositions, call it A. Now,
starting with A, let us say that the set of all propositions in A and all those propositions
that we can infer from A make up a second set, call it T. For any T, if T forms a bijection
with any other set, call it M, that is, if for every element in T there is one and only one
element in M such that the two form a pair and vice versa, then if we call T our “theory”,
we can call M the model of our theory T. The illustration Van Fraassen uses is
geometric: given some set of axioms, the simplest geometric figure for which each axiom
and anything we could infer from them (we call these inferences theorems) is true of the
figure, that figure is the model for our theory, made up of our axioms and their
inferences. Considering scientific theories in this set theoretic semantics, we can
understand the job of the real world scientist to be identifying that special set of axioms
and theorems that is made true by a special model: the model equivalent to the real
world. The model that is equivalent to the real world is unique in that we gain knowledge
of the model in a piecewise manner. Every observation we make shows one particular
piece of the model. If theory testing is comparing real world outcomes that we observe to
the predictions of our theory, under a set-theoretic semantics, what predictions amount to
are inferring theorems from our axioms. To test if our theory is made true by the real
world, we try and recreate the necessary preconditions (The relevant axioms and
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theorems) needed to create the prediction our theory makes. If we do our experiment
correctly, the outcome will give us a true part of the model, and whether or not our
axioms and theorems correctly predicted the part of the model we would observe
determines how true the theory is; how close it is to the final theory, the theory made true
by the entire model of the real world.
So if we stick to a set-theoretic semantics for theories, we find ourselves in a
situation of uncertainty with respect to the theory true of the real world, but also to the
complete model that is the real world. Given some subset of the complete model of the
real world, let's call them W, we can see how more or less true all the competing theories
we have are. In this way, given any subset of the model of the real world, each additional
piece of our model informs us about the probability distribution over possible events in
the real world, the rules governing the behaviour of things in the real world, and the
probability that any particular theory will be made true by the whole model of the real
world. We gain more pieces of our model by running experiments, where the outcome is
some piece of the model or another that we then compare to what each of our theories
says should have happened. The theory that gets it the most right we then consider to be
more likely the true theory, and so on.

Mary's Lamb Gone Astray
So what does this have to do with Mary? Well think about what Frank Jackson
claims she is in possession of before watching the color television: all physical
facts/information. If Mary has any facts at all, they are of the world, meaning they are
pieces of the model that is the real world, where here “real” is an indexical, the facts are a
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part of whatever world is real to the Mary we are thinking about, the possible world we
imagine her to be in. And if Mary has all physical information, the only thing the
information could inform about are the physical truths of the world. What all this means
in the light of information theory and set theoretic semantics for scientific theories is that
A) Mary could receive no message at this point that would inform her about anything
physical, and B) Mary can learn no new fact at this point that was a physical fact. But if
she has all the physical facts, we can say she has the complete physical model of the
world. If she has the final physical model, she has the final physical theory, because
nothing she can learn at this point can inform her; she has 100% of the relevant
information, and so knows the exact distribution of probabilities of competing physical
theories, in this case, one theory in particular, the true final theory, has a 100%
probability of being correct, and all other theories have a zero percent probability.
Remember this is all before she has ever seen any color beyond black and white. So
concerning the color television: we agreed that if she were to see the colored television
having complete physical knowledge, that it’s possible she learn a new fact which would
necessarily be non-physical.
But Mary is a scientist after all, let’s see her do some science! Suppose she made
a prediction about what she will experience when viewing the colored television, i.e.
predicting all the physical facts that will be true under the initial conditions represented
by her viewing color on the screen. Either she will have predicted the complete set of
facts that is equivalent to the outcome; everything that will happen we she views the
colored images, or she will not. Given her knowledge of only those things that are
physical or that supervene on the physical, she will be unable to predict anything non-
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physical happening, that is to say, that if it were the case that she learned something, that
which she learned would inform her about her theory of reality, specifically, that the final
model of the real world is not equivalent to the physical model of the real world. So she
makes her prediction, she infers a theorem, and this theorem represents what she thinks
will happen when she sees the colored images on the television screen. She will only be
able to predict a fully physical outcome, and whether it is equivalent to the actual
outcome or not, she will believe beforehand that the predicted outcome will be a
complete prediction of what will happen. Now at this point, there are only two consistent
possible outcomes:
1. Her prediction is complete, and she learns nothing.
2. Her predictions is incomplete, and she will learn a new fact.
If it is the case that 1. occurs, then there are no facts, physical or nonphysical, to be
learned by Mary from watching a color tv screen, and if it is the case that 2. occurs, there
must have been at least one nonphysical fact that Mary learned by watching color
television. Now let us make clear that her physical theory of reality is still a theory of
reality first, and a physical theory of reality by happenstance, since it includes only
physical axioms and theorems. Whether or not it is a true theory of reality depends on if it
is complete when including only physical facts. It makes no sense to say that her final
and complete physical theory is either final of complete if it turns out there are nonphysical facts about reality. For the purely physical theory would be true with regard to
some other model, that is not the actual world, but is instead some possible world with at
least one less fact than the actual world, and including only the physical facts in her
theory.
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When we consider the possibility that she learns from watching color TV, what
effect does this have on her physical theory? If it informs her of anything in her physical
theory, then it was not final, since there was a non-zero probability on more than one
model that could possibly make the theory true. That is to say, no matter if a fact, or
information, etc. is physical or nonphysical, a final physical theory meant to represent the
real world will be informed by any and all information relevant to the model that makes
the theory true or false, that is, nature. So if she learns from watching color tv, she would
beforehand believe that she has the final theory of reality, and afterward have been
informed that her original theory is made true by a model that isn't reality, and have been
given a new piece of the model that is reality. But she has all physical information;
nothing more can inform her about which model is the one that makes her physical theory
true. So even after watching the colored television, it makes no sense to say that any
nonphysical fact could inform her about her physical theory, which is coincidentally her
theory of reality. So even if she were to become aware of some nonphysical fact, she
would not change her theory of reality. But how does that make sense? What this seems
to suggest is that there is a third possible outcome: That her prediction is complete, and
she will learn a new fact. But that is blatantly contradictory. She cannot both be surprised
and know what is going to happen. It seems we have reasoned out a contradiction. Either
Mary predicts everything true of her future color tv viewing, and learns nothing by
viewing color tv for the first time, which is equivalent to saying that her complete
physical theory is a complete theory of reality, or, she learns something which is a
nonphysical fact, but it does not affect her theory of reality. Let us consider further some
consequences of a final physical theory: If nothing can inform us about our theory and
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the model that makes it true, there cannot exist any unpredicted outcome. If the outcome
is not exactly as predicted, then our theory isn’t final. So Mary’s theory, if truly final,
must predict the complete set of theorems that constitute the outcome of her watching
colored tv. But this does not mean that all the facts must be representative of positive
facts. A theory makes as many claims about what is not and cannot be the case, as it does
what will be the case. So think about the negative predictions Mary could make:
everything her theory predicts will have to come to pass, because her theory is complete
and final, and an incorrect prediction means the theory is neither complete nor final, and
is so not a possibility. So if we maintain our assumption that a nonphysical fact is
possible, meaning there is at least one part of the model representative of the real world
that is nonphysical, then a completely physical theory of this same model made true by
the real world would have to predict the existence of a nonphysical fact. If we are asked
to assume that Mary has a final physical theory, that means there is nothing she can learn
that will inform her as to which model makes her theory true, and that so far, everything
in her theory has been true of the real world. Remember that a theory is made true by the
simplest model for which all its axioms and theorems are true. So that means that there
can be nothing that escapes Mary’s physical theory that is a part of the real world, if it is
precisely the real world that makes her theory final. Herein lies the reason for our
contradiction: it just makes no sense to say that a theory is final and complete relative to a
model that includes a part that escapes theory. Either the theory is made true by the
model, the whole model, or it isn’t made true by that model at all.
In “The Price of an Ultimate Theory,” Nicholas Rescher makes an argument
against the possibility of the traditional conception of a final theory. He starts by
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assuming what is traditionally called the Principle of Sufficient Reason. It simply states
that everything that is true has a reason for being so, or in Rescher’s formulation, for any
fact f, there is at least one fact f’ that explains f. Next, he goes on to postulate some
features of final theory. It would seem that if a theory were final, it would be what
Rescher calls comprehensive. This is a binary relation between our theory and all facts,
where for any fact f, the explanation of f is a part of our theory, T*. So that no fact is left
unexplained by the axioms and postulates of our final theory. A final theory would also
have what he calls finality, that is, since our theory T* “affords” all explanations, and the
truth of T* is itself a fact, then the only thing that could explain T* were it truly the final
theory would be T* itself. But we normally forbid this sort of explanation; a fact does not
explain itself, a principle that Rescher calls non-circularity, that there does not exist a fact
such that that fact explains itself. So it seems, that we cannot maintain all four of the
following propositions as consistent: The Principle of Sufficient Reason,
Comprehensiveness of a final theory, Finality of a final theory, and Non-Circularity. At
least one of these four must be rejected as false, or we must accept that we cannot have a
final theory. If we cannot have a final theory, then Jackson’s argument does not prove
that physicalism is false, because the first premise in the Hail Mary form, that Mary has
the final physical theory, would be false.
I can think of no compelling reason to reject any of the four properties required
for a final theory, so it seems to me at least that it would be better to reject the notion that
there could even be a final theory. Furthermore, we seemed to be getting a contradiction
from the premises of the Hail Mary form of the argument. If we reject any of these four
principles, we can maintain the validity of Jackson’s the knowledge arguments and the

25
truth of all the premises, but if this were are response we would continue to infer a
contradiction. For these two reasons, it seems the best choice to reject the truth of
premise one. But let us consider the alternatives.
We could reject premise two, but I do feel that it is intuitive that Mary would
learn by seeing colored tv for the first time, so I will maintain this intuition if at all
possible. Let us try three then. If we reject three, we are asserting that it is not the case
that if physicalism is true that the psychophysical conditional is necessary and a priori. P
then Q is equivalent by way of material implication to asserting that either Q or not P.
The negation of which is equivalent to saying that not Q and not not P by De Morgen’s
Theorem, and this to not Q and P by double negation. So the negation of premise for is
the same as asserting that “it is not the case that the psychophysical conditional is
necessary and a priori, and physicalism is true”. This means that either it is possible for
physicalism to be true and that the psychophysical conditional is not necessary but is a
priori or that physicalism is true and the psychophysical conditional is necessary but a
posteriori. If the former, since not all psychological facts are supervenient on the
physical, physicalism can be true while there is simultaneously some fact about other
people’s mental states that is nonphysical, and so the modus tollens in the Hail Mary
form does not hold; Mary could learn something nonphysical and physicalism could be
true. But this is contradictory, because physicalism is exactly the assertion that there is no
nonphysical fact. If the later, the a posteriori nature of the psychophysical conditional
means that the knowledge argument is not a valid argument against physicalism; Mary
could not know the complete and final physical theory before ever having left her room if
at least some of those things supervenient on the physical could not be known a priori. If
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we reject four, the knowledge argument again loses its validity; it is equivalent to
asserting that “there is not at least one nonphysical fact and Mary knows all physical
facts” by the same method used on the psychophysical conditional.
So if we reject premise three, we get a contradiction, but if we maintain all of our
premises, we likewise get a contradiction. We have but three alternatives:
1. Mary does not know a complete physical theory before leaving her room.
2. It is not possible for Mary to learn something new by watching color tv.
3. There is not at least one physical fact and Mary knows all physical facts.
But if you still feel that two is intuitive, as I do, we can say instead that either Mary
does not know a complete physical theory before leaving her room, and this is precisely
why she can learn by seeing color for the first time, or that there is not any nonphysical
facts, and Mary knows all physical facts before leaving her room, and she learns when
she sees color tv for the first time. But this exactly the conjunction that generated a
contradiction earlier! We then have no choice but to accept that either if Mary learns
from seeing color for the first time, then she does not know all the physical facts
beforehand, or we get a contradiction. It therefore seems that Mary cannot both know all
physical facts before leaving her room, and learn something new by watching color tv for
the first time. This is only the case if there are no nonphysical facts to be learned.
Therefore, if Mary knows all physical facts, then physicalism is true. Since we cannot
have a final theory, it is impossible that Mary know all physical facts, meaning that the
rejection of two to try and salvage the argument fails. If Mary learns nothing new from
seeing color tv, then she knows a complete theory of reality that is purely physical, and
there is not even one nonphysical fact. But since she cannot have a final theory of this
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type, rejecting two means only that Mary knows beforehand whatever it is she would
have learned from watching colored tv, with whatever these facts may be neither
necessarily physical nor nonphysical.
Before we even have a knowledge argument, I believe Jackson to have also made a
mistake in the understanding of his knowledge intuition. I share his feeling, that were
Mary to see color for the first time, it would be totally different from any sort of fact she
could learn from a textbook, and she would indeed learn something the first time she
smelled a rose no matter how much she knows beforehand about the physiology of smell
and the chemical properties of a rose, or whatever. The mistake is when he considers the
latter sort of knowledge, and the actual knowledge gained from smelling the rose, to be
distinct. The separation of phenomenal knowledge and physical knowledge is a false
dichotomy. Phenomenal knowledge just is physical knowledge. The false dichotomy
here, in the very beginning, is what messes us up in the thought experiment; yes, it is
intuitive to think that if Mary had never seen color, watching a colored television
program would teach her something new. But this new knowledge we only believe to be
necessarily nonphysical if we accept the divide between physical and phenomenal
knowledge. If they are one and the same, she will learn something new, but in a new
modality than she is used to, without any need for it to be nonphysical. Were she to know
the complete theory of physics and still learn afterwards something new by watching
colored tv, it would appear to be the case that whatever she learns is nonphysical; but a
final theory has been demonstrated to be impossible, and only if she knows a final theory
does her learning from colored tv point to anything nonphysical, otherwise, she just
learned something new that was physical, but of a new modality of experience.
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In conclusion, we might sum up my objection to Jackson’s thought experiment
thusly: A theory is always a theory of something. What makes a theory true is the model
equivalent to that thing of which we are trying to theorize. To say that we have a final
theory, is to say we know everything there is to know about that which we are trying to
theorize. Saying that the theory is a x-theory of y, is irrelevant to whether or not it is a
final theory of y. If it is final, nothing can change it, we know all the relevant
information. What Jackson gets wrong in his thought experiments is that he trusts his
intuitions too readily, something we have all been guilty of. If anything, Mary can teach
us one thing: that we must think and speak carefully and skeptically about even those
things we may trust most, our intuitive introspections.
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